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ABSTRACT: In this paper a critique to Cartwright’s approaches of capacities and nomological machines is carried out. 
This approaches share the idea that invariant knowledge is crucial for achieving policy purposes. However, it 
is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited 
to the logic of “open-ended results”. On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex-ante inter-
ventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dy-
namic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem 
of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models.
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RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo se hará una crítica a los enfoques de capacidades y máquinas nomológicas propuestos 
por Cartwright. Estos enfoques comparten la idea de que un conocimiento invariante es crucial para el éxito de 
una política. No obstante, aquí se mostrará que los procesos socioeconómicos no son compatibles con la lógica 
de los factores causales estables, sino con la lógica de los “resultados de final abierto”. Sobre la base de esta va-
riante ontológica se argumentará que las intervenciones ex-ante no son apropiadas en el reino de lo socioeconó-
mico. Por el contrario, deberían ser entendidas en un sentido “dinámico”. Finalmente, se propondrá al análisis 
de robustez derivacional como una herramienta útil para superar el problema de “sobre-restricción”, un pro-
blema típico de los modelos económicos.
Palabras clave: invarianza, intervención, máquinas nomológicas, capacidades, análisis de robustez derivacional.
Introduction
According to many approaches in the philosophy of science, adequate interventions must 
be grounded on prior knowledge of stable or invariant causal factors. This knowledge has 
been conceptualized in different ways: as regularities that support “active” counterfactuals 
(Woodward 2003), as “capacities” (Cartwright 1989), as mechanisms (Bunge 1997; 2004; 
Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Glennan 2002; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), as 
nomological machines (Cartwright 1997; 1999), etc. Invariance is an important require-
ment for interventionist purposes, since when an intervention is carried out we are ex-
pected to know what the result of manipulating a factor or set of factors will be, and with-
out invariance such predictions seem to be practically impossible.
Using invariant causal factors for interventionist or policy purposes is a very intuitive 
idea, and it is permanently performed both in the social and the natural sciences. Once we 
test that there exists an invariant relationship (or at least a stable contribution) between the 
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use of fexofenadine and lower levels of histamine in the human body, physicians prescribe 
that drug in case their patients experience allergic reactions. In the Machamer et al. termi-
nology we may say that invariant relationships are a consequence of stable activities. In the 
case of the natural sciences, such activities take place because of the specific properties of en-
tities, and these properties hardly change overtime. However, in the case of the social sci-
ences in general and in economics in particular, activities are nothing more than individuals’ 
actions. More precisely, people’s decisions depend on a myriad of factors, namely the infor-
mation they receive from the world, the way in which they interpret such information, their 
expectations about future, the background conditions such as cultural and institutional fac-
tors, etc. This means that people’s actions are not stable per se. Quite the contrary, socioeco-
nomic phenomena are best suited to the logic of possibility trees or open-ended results: given 
a certain event (inflation, an increase in government spending, union strikes, etc.), different 
ways or alternatives are plausible. The resulting event will depend on what signals individu-
als receive, how they form their expectations, what the institutional framework is, etc.
If this is true, then meeting the requirement of invariant knowledge for policy pur-
poses does not seem feasible in economics. On the one hand, because there are incompati-
bilities at an ontological level: there are no stable contributions but open-ended results. On 
the other hand, because even if stable causal factors are “hunted” in the right way, there is 
no guarantee that such stability will prevail in other scenarios (see Cartwright 2007). Nev-
ertheless, the fact that there is no invariant knowledge in the socioeconomic realm (or that 
it is more the exception than the rule) does not mean that policies cannot be implemented. 
Indeed, this is something that is commonly done (and often successfully). In this sense, this 
paper aims to reflect both about the kind of knowledge used for policy implementation 
purposes and about the ways in which such interventions are carried out. It will be argued 
that theoretical knowledge provided by economic models may be comprehended as blue-
prints, where a set of conditions that limit the range of possibilities of a social system in or-
der to achieve the desired result is specified. Following the Bunge’s distinction (1997) be-
tween “conceptual system” and “concrete system”, it will be shown that such knowledge is 
not about stable causal contributions, but rather about logical relations that could turn into 
causal relations as long as the gap between the conceptual and concrete systems is filled.
To some extent, there is compatibility between the Cartwright’s idea of the “dappled 
world” and the approach defended in the present paper, since both emphasizes the importance 
of the domain or range of applicability in the understanding of economic models. In this junc-
ture, for every real world scenario there would be a model or blueprint which provides infor-
mation about the conditions that need to be met for the purpose of achieving a result. How-
ever, the use of this kind of theoretical knowledge may involve external validity problems: 
those where the model results can only be exported to circumstances identical to the context 
in which the result was obtained. This case concerns the social sciences in general and econom-
ics in particular. According to Cartwright (2009a), economic models are “over-constrained” by 
structural assumptions: since the model results are inferred under very specific circumstances, 
there is no guarantee that they will be obtained in domains different than the model.
Although the approach of the present paper is consistent with the idea of “overcon-
straint”, implications are different from one another. While it is true that all the model as-
sumptions are necessary for making inferences, it will be argued that only some of them are 
relevant for the construction and implementation of a socioeconomic blueprint. Let’s take 
for instance assumptions like homogeneous goods, continuous and differentiable produc-
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tion functions everywhere in the interior of the production set, economies with only two 
agents, etc. These assumptions play the heuristic role of simplifying the inference results 
(see Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009; Musgrave 1981). If so, then their presence in other 
scenarios (not only other models, but also the real world) is not important for exporting 
the model results. In this sense, derivational robustness analysis may be a good method for 
distinguishing which of the model assumptions are relevant for policy purposes and which 
just play a tractability role.
This paper is divided as follows. In the next section two Cartwright’s ways of concep-
tualizing invariant knowledge are examined: capacities and nomological machines. In the 
third section an ontological alternative to these approaches is offered, and it is asserted that 
socioeconomic phenomena are better suited to the rationale of possibility trees or open-
ended results than to the rationale of stable causal factors. In the fourth section an alterna-
tive to the Cartwright’s problem of overconstraint is proposed. More precisely, it is argued 
that, as long as economic models are subjected to a derivational robustness analysis, such 
models will be able to provide exportable information. In the fifth section a different way 
of how to conceptualize the notion of intervention is examined: not as an “ex-ante” idea (as 
proposed by several philosophical approaches), but as a “dynamic” idea, where manipula-
tions are carried out all along the socioeconomic process. The paper culminates mention-
ing some extensions for further discussions.
Invariance in policy implementation: the Nancy Cartwright’s approach
In modern Philosophy of Science there exists a certain consensus on defending the idea 
that some kind of stable causal knowledge is needed for accomplishing interventionist pur-
poses in general and for policy and planning in particular. Such stability is crucial, since one 
of the main goals of an intervention is to predict an outcome or control the value of a vari-
able by manipulating certain factors.
Different ways of conceptualizing this knowledge have been offered.1 One of these 
is Nancy Cartwright’s “capacities” approach. In order to understand scientific practice, 
C artwright (1989) argues that the causal claims of science are not about regularities or con-
stant conjunctions of events, but about adscription of capacities that underlie such phenom-
ena. Broadly speaking, capacities are properties of entities or structures that contribute to the 
production of a result in a stable manner. Nevertheless, such a “contribution” should not be 
understood in law-like terms. When it is asserted that “aspirin has the capacity to relieve head-
aches”, it is said that there exists an entity (aspirin) that has the property of producing a result 
(headache relief). This does not mean that aspirin always relieves headaches, or that it relieves 
headaches most of the time. Rather it is simply asserted that there exists a relatively enduring 
and stable capacity that an entity carries with itself from case to case (C artwright 1989).
According to Cartwright (1998) capacities have the following features: (1) potential-
ity, (2) causation, and (3) stability. Point (1) refers to the very contribution of a causal fac-
tor, which may be perturbed due to the operation of other factors. With regard to (2), “ca-
1 See for instance Woodward (2003), Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), Glennan (2002), etc. Neverthe-
less, for space reasons these approaches will not be considered in the present paper. 
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pacity” is an irreducible causal notion, that is to say, it is not expressed in terms of constant 
conjunction of events (such as the Humean’s approach of causation), relations of counter-
factual dependence (e.g., Woodward 2003), or the like. Finally in (3), if an entity has in-
deed the capacity to produce a result, then the relationship must be stable through a certain 
range of circumstances.
For example, let’s suppose that economists have established that the growth of the 
money supply in an economy has the capacity to increase the level of national income. Ac-
cording to Cartwright’s approach, we can say that
1. Money supply is not only (positively) correlated with the national income, but also 
the former actively produces a change in the latter.
2. Although the quantity of money is increasing, it is not possible to predict the be-
havior of the national income, because there are always other causal factors that 
may interfere with the causal contribution of the money supply.
3. The capacity of the growth of the quantity of money to increase the national in-
come is stable across some range of situations (e.g., geographical regions, economic 
policies, etc.).
Points 2 and 3 appear to be contradictory, but they are not. “Stability” is not the same as 
“regularity”. Regularity is a pattern of (high) correlation at the level of events. On the con-
trary, stability is related to the very contribution of a causal factor to the production of a 
result. In this sense, it is pertinent to note that the notion of capacity rests on a three-fold 
distinction: the obtaining of the capacity, its exercise and the manifest results (Cartwright 
2009a). For example, the fact that money supply has the capacity to bring about changes 
in the national income is just an “ontological” issue: there exists the chance that no policy 
maker has ever taken the decision to increase the quantity of money in an economy. The 
capacity exists (or has been obtained, for that matter), but it has not been exercised. Like-
wise, a positive change in the quantity of money may be carried out. However, this does not 
guarantee an increase in the national income. In this case the capacity is exercised, but the 
manifests results do not take place at the level of events.
Capacities are the primitive elements of the world. Regularities are secondary. More pre-
cisely, Cartwright (1995; 1997; 1999) asserts that there are no laws in the sense of universal 
regularities or regular associations between properties. The world is “messy” and “dappled”, 
so laws turn out to be observable only in rare circumstances where a particular system of 
components is properly “shielded” from external influences. Cartwright calls them nomo-
logical machines, where a nomological machine is “a fixed (enough) arrangement of com-
ponents, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) 
environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behavior that we 
represent in our scientific laws” (Cartwright 1999, 50).
Good examples of what a nomological machine is are vending machines. They are ma-
chines whose repeated functioning gives rise to a law or a regular association between prop-
erties. This process begins after the customer inserts currency or a token into the machine 
and selects the wanted article. There are a series of mechanical processes inside the machine 
that end up with the obtaining of the selected product. The “law” emerges from the satis-
factory and repeated functioning of the vending machine: if X (the coin inserted) is to oc-
cur, Y (the good obtained) will take place. However, for this to happen, the machine must 
be shielded or isolated from anything that might disturb the internal operation. This is 
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precisely what happens with a vending machine: the mechanism is shielded from several 
(though not all) types of external influences.
As can be seen, for Cartwright invariant regularities are possible, but conditioned by 
ceteris paribus clauses. The traditional view assumes that situation for the social sciences. 
Cartwright rejects this position, noting that almost all scientific regularities hold only ce-
teris paribus. Even physics needs machines to generate regularities, machines in the sense 
of stable configurations of components properly shielded and repeatedly set running 
(C artwright 1995).
Whether they be, nomological machines or capacities, they are different ways of con-
ceptualizing a causal knowledge which, since it has the property of being stable or invariant, 
it may be useful for political purposes. However, the mere discovery of invariant causal fac-
tors does not guarantee the success of a policy once these are “used” or implemented. Here 
there exists a clear problem of external validity which is associated with a lack of a “bridge” 
that connects the discovery of causal factors with their respective use. Without this bridge, 
there is no warranty that a causal factor will work in different circumstances or scenarios, 
regardless of its level of invariance (see Cartwright 2007; Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011).
Nevertheless, in Cartwright (2011; 2012), Cartwright, and Hardie (2013) and Rol 
and Cartwright (2012) it has been suggested that the best way to overcome this problem 
is to focus on the details of the population in which the intervention is intended to be im-
plemented. Methods for hunting causes only provide information regarding a policy that 
worked somewhere. However, the real interest underlying policy purposes is associated with 
the causal knowledge that turns out to be relevant for the new policy to be implemented, 
and not for the others. In this sense, Cartwright and Hardie (2013) and Cartwright (2012) 
consider that a policymaker should perform two searches prior to implementing a policy: 
the horizontal search and the vertical search. In the vertical search, one must find out if the 
causal principle has been described at the right level of description. Such principle must be 
general enough to be applicable to both the system under study and the target system. Like-
wise, in the horizontal search, the policy maker considers whether the support factors ob-
tained in the studied population are obtained in the target population as well. As we can 
see, the need for a stable causal contribution still remains. The only difference is that now 
this contribution is complemented with a set of support factors.
Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results
The approaches discussed above share the ontological assumption that there are stable 
causal factors in the socioeconomic realm. Since one of the main purposes of the present 
paper is to examine the conditions that contribute to a successful policy implementation, 
it is important to take into account some ontological aspects of the socioeconomic phe-
nomena. Following the dualistic ontology of mechanisms proposed in Machamer, Darden 
and Craver (2000) and in Machamer (2004), causal relationships are mediated by activi-
ties. Activities are the producers of change. They are types of causes. However, Machamer 
et al. follow Anscombe’s idea that the word “cause” itself is fairly general and only becomes 
meaningful when complemented by other, more specific, causal verbs. Thus, activities are 
not a mere description of the kind of changes that occur, but they are in fact responsible, in 
a causal sense, of the changes that take place in a mechanism.
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In the Machamer et al.’s approach activities are usually stable. This stability guaran-
tees the mechanism stable behavior. However, in the social realm the very notion of ac-
tivity is represented by people’s actions, which are not necessarily stable or invariant. Peo-
ple’s actions depend on a myriad of factors, and changes in any of them may affect decision 
making and therefore people’s activities. On the one hand, individuals’ actions depend on 
signals from the world (e.g., changes in macroeconomic variables, the front page of a news-
paper, a financial rumor). These signals are interpreted by people. Once people receive and 
interpret signals, they form expectations about future states of the world, which will be de-
cisive in their decision making. Likewise, people’s actions are influenced by contextual or 
structural conditions (e.g., institutions, environment, culture, moral principles, etc.). Take 
for example the case of institutions. Almost without exception, in social systems there ex-
ist a great number of norms and institutions which may be understood as a set of rules that 
coordinate people’s activities through restrictions or prohibitions. However, the concept of 
“institution” is not necessarily associated with a restriction on freedom of action. Rather, 
some social institutions enable the exercise of certain decisions (such as the stock market: 
an institution that promotes the exercise of speculative activities).
One of the characteristics of socioeconomic processes is that their basic structure re-
sponds to the logic of possibility trees or open-ended results: when a causal factor is acti-
vated, there are multiple possible decisions. Depending on which actions people carry out, 
different results will be achieved. For example, let X be the causal variable, Y the effect, and 
A the people’s activity. Let’s suppose that X takes the value X0. Unlike those approaches 
that assume invariance, here Y can have more than one value (Y1, Y2, ..., Yn). It all depends 
on people’s activities A1, A2, ..., An.
A good example of a socioeconomic process is the so called “Keynes effect”. According to 
this effect, an increase in money supply leads to a decrease in the interest rate, stimulating 
investment and consequently employment and production. In some interpretations it is as-
sumed that an increase in the quantity of money leads automatically and in a stable way to a 
decrease in the interest rate. The same applies for the rest of the sequence. However, this is 
not true. On the contrary, depending on the contextual framework and people’s interpreta-
tions and expectations, different paths will be plausible in a socioeconomic process. Aware 
of these limitations, Keynes says:
For whilst an increase in the quantity of money may be expected, cet. par., to reduce the rate 
of interest, this will not happen if the liquidity preferences of the public are increasing more than 
the quantity of money; and whilst a decline in the rate of interest may be expected, cet. par., to in-
crease the volume of investment, this will not happen if the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital is falling more rapidly than the rate of interest; and whilst an increase in the volume of in-
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vestment may be expected, cet. par., to increase employment, this may not happen if the propen-
sity to consume is falling off. Finally, if employment increases, prices will rise in a degree partly 
governed by the shapes of the physical supply functions, and partly by the liability of the wage-
unit to rise in terms of money. And when output has increased and prices have risen, the effect 
of this on liquidity-preference will be to increase the quantity of money necessary to maintain a 
given rate of interest. (Keynes 1936, 155)
In the Keynes effect, economic variables are linked through people’s activities. In other 
words, these actions are responsible for enabling the causal link between economic variables. 
Nonetheless, socioeconomic activities are not linear, but they may change for lots of reasons. 
When this happens, a modification in the causal links will be observed. Since these changes 
are plausible, the feasibility of finding invariant causal factors can be put into question.
Let’s begin with the case of socioeconomic capacities. When an entity or variable has 
a capacity, it means that there is a causal factor that, if properly exercised, contributes in a 
stable way to the production of an effect (we should remember that such an exercise does 
not guarantee the manifest results of the causal contribution). However, this concept con-
trasts strongly with the idea that socioeconomic phenomena depend on the interpretations 
agents make of the signals of the world, the background conditions, etc. Let’s take the ex-
ample of the Keynes effect. If understood as a capacity, we could assert that “money sup-
ply have the capacity to increase the national income of a country”. But this is not the only 
possible result: an excess supply of money will not necessarily be associated with an increase 
in the demand for financial assets. It is plausible that such extra money may be used for in-
creasing the demand of goods and services. In this case, a rise in the general level of prices 
is likely to occur. Finally, let’s assume another scenario where high uncertainty is what 
prevails. In such a case, the liquidity preferences of the public will increase more than the 
quantity of money. If so, then no changes in the macroeconomic variables will be observed.
The above example reveals that the rationale of the capacities approach is different 
from the rationale of socioeconomic processes. When a triggering factor is activated —in 
this case the money supply—, different causal contributions may be exercised. The asser-
tion that whenever we increase the money supply a causal force that contributes to an in-
crease in the national income will occur is not true, nor is it true that in some cases the 
expected results may not appear because of the exercise of disturbing factors. Quite the 
contrary, in each case the exercise of causal factors is different: in one of the cases people in-
crease the demand for goods and services; in another they increase the demand for financial 
assets; and in the last case people end up hoarding the extra money. There are also prob-
lems in obtaining capacities. In Cartwright’s approach, capacities can be “hunted” with 
the method of isolation. Isolation is possible since the contribution of a capacity is singular 
—that is to say, there is only one activity involved—. In the case of socio-economic proc-
esses, however, there are no capacities to isolate, since there is no singular contribution be-
tween cause and effect, but a set of potential activities involved.
Thus, the ontology of socioeconomic capacities should be replaced for an ontology of 
possibility trees or open-ended results. From this new perspective, causal contributions would 
have no predetermined capacity, but a set of potential capacities, which crucially depend on 
the multiple activities agents are able to perform. The Keynes effect is not a capacity, be-
cause in the economic realm there is no singular connection between money supply and the 
national income. The Keynes effect is just a possible path or scenario among many other 
scenarios that involve increases in money supply.
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In a possible interpretation it could be said that Cartwright would not disagree with 
the approach of open-ended results. In fact, in Cartwright and Hardie (2013) specifically 
talks about how the support factors complement the variable policy or causal principle. 
However, we must remember that the support factors and the causal principle lie in differ-
ent levels of abstraction. For instance, knowing that nutritional counseling for those who 
procure the family food and control its distribution in the family improves the child’s nu-
trition does not tell anything about which people must be advised in different cities. This 
information is provided by the support factors. However, support factors do not play the 
role of closing the possibility trees into a unique result,2 but of complementing the causal 
principle through concrete specifications. The importance of complementing a causal prin-
ciple with a set of support factors is recognized, but the need for a stable causal contribu-
tion (in this case, the causal principle) still remains.
Neither are socioeconomic processes the product of nomological machines. In build-
ing a nomological machine it is necessary that its constituent elements be correctly assem-
bled and protected from any perturbing factors, so that whenever X is to occur, Y will be 
the obtained result. Let’s assume for a moment that it is possible to set up the machine in 
the economic realm. The problems will arise when such machine is intended to be pro-
tected from perturbing factors. In a vending machine the internal mechanism is protected 
from many external factors. This allows it to exhibit a regular behavior, in the sense that 
(almost) always that coins are inserted into the slot the selected product is provided by the 
machine.
However, it is a bit unrealistic to think that nomological machines are plausible in the 
socioeconomic realm. To begin with, socioeconomic processes are a kind of phenomena 
that take place in open systems (see Lawson 1997). That means any unexpected exogenous 
factor can disrupt the functioning of the machine. In such systems prevails uncertainty, so 
we are not able to know for sure what will happen in the near future. We can predict with 
some confidence the occurrence of certain events, but they are not guaranteed at all. Even 
worse, we do not even think about the factual possibility of a myriad of phenomena. If we 
are not able to know what factors are to occur in future, then it seems inappropriate pre-
tending to shield a machine from unknown factors. How we can nullify or counteract the 
effect of something that we do not know?
Even if we assume the feasibility of shielding a socioeconomic machine, there is the 
chance that, because of “endogenous” problems, such machine may yield unstable results. 
For instance, the Keynes effect may be understood as a nomological machine, provided that 
certain antecedent conditions are fulfilled. Let’s suppose that the policy maker has been do-
ing everything he can to make it work in the real world. If so, then a high positive correla-
tion between money supply and national income will be observed. However, let’s suppose 
now that, at some point during the year, a little group of businessmen believes that they 
could sell much less than expected, and because of this the level of investment decreases. 
Suppose further that this strategy spreads towards other businessmen. The wider the scope, 
the greater the negative effect on employment and production. Clearly, such instability is 
not the result of failures in the shielding or in the assembling of parts. Rather, it has its ori-
gin in an “endogenous” problem.
2 This point will be examined in the next section.
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Models and robustness analysis
In The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Nancy Cartwright (1999) crit-
icizes the positivist approach to science. For her, much of what occurs in the real world oc-
curs by hap, subject to no law at all. Because of this lack of laws the world is both “messy” 
and “dappled”. There is no guarantee that a regularity (if possible) will remain invariant 
over time.
In this sense, there is some compatibility between the idea of a “dappled world” and 
the approach defended in the present paper. Firstly, the real world is understood as a sys-
tem where there are no constant conjunctions of events or regular connections per se. If 
they emerge, it is because there is an ensemble of causal factors that remain invariant at 
that point of time. In addition, the concept of “dappled world” emphasizes the importance 
of the domain or range of applicability in the understanding of economic models. More 
precisely, according to this approach it is possible that several models are “true”, provided 
they belong to different domains. If this is correct, then for every real world scenario there 
would be a model which provides information about the conditions that need to be met for 
the purpose of achieving a result. Thus, economic models (at least some types of them) may 
be understood as blueprints for policy implementation. Such information is important for 
policy makers, as they would have a theoretical basis for closing the possibility trees of the 
real world in order to reach the desired goal. Let’s see some assumptions of the Keynes ef-
fect:
1. There are constant returns to scale so that prices do not rise or fall as output in-
creases.
2. Investment depends on entrepreneurs’ expectations and on interest rate.
3. There is a negative causal relationship between interest rate and investment.
4. There are three kinds of liquidity-preference which may be defined as depending 
on
ii(i) the transactions-motive, i.e. the need of cash for the current transaction of 
personal and business exchanges;
i(ii) the precautionary-motive, i.e. the desire for security as to the future cash 
equivalent of a certain proportion of total resources; and
(iii) the speculative-motive, i.e. the object of securing profit from knowing better 
than the market what the future will bring forth.
5. Money demand depends negatively on the interest rate and positively on the in-
come.
6. Money supply is inelastic with respect to interest rate.
7. Changes in primary employment (in the investment industries) bring about pro-
portionally greater changes in total employment.
8. The marginal propensity to consume remains constant throughout the changes in 
income.
Taking into account the rationale of socioeconomic processes, the assumptions mentioned 
above may be understood as a set of conditions that, if successfully accomplished in the real 
world, then an increase in the quantity of money would contribute to an increase in the na-
tional income. It is not asserted that there are always constant returns to scale so that prices 
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do not rise or fall as output increases, but that it is crucial that there are constant returns to 
scale so that the causal relationship between money supply and income may emerge. Other-
wise the socioeconomic process could go on another branch of the possibility tree, making 
the reached result different than expected.
The approach defended in the present paper is also —though not entirely— com-
patible with the notion of “overconstraint” (Cartwright 2009a). Specifically, Cartwright 
(2007; 2009a) asserts that as long as economic models mimic Galilean experiments, they 
will teach us about capacities. However, the author realizes that many of the assumptions 
of economic models are not Galilean idealizations, that is to say, they are not used with the 
purpose of neutralizing the impact of perturbing factors. According to Cartwright, in sci-
ences like physics there are many principles. This facilitates inferring results using Galilean 
idealizations. However, this does not seem to be the case for economics. Unlike physics, 
economics has very few non-controversial principles, which leads to the problem of over-
constraint: because the number of economic principles is scarce or not enough for inferring 
results, it is necessary to add structural or non-Galilean idealizations to economic models. 
This makes the results strongly depend on the structure of models. If so, then such models 
will not be able to teach us about tendencies or capacities. Something similar is defended 
here: because economics capacities are conceptualized in a potential sense, then the only 
way to reach inferences in economic models is adding structural assumptions.
From this latter idea Cartwright gets an important implication: if models are over-con-
strained by structural assumptions, then it will not be possible to extrapolate the inferred 
results to situations falling outside the range of applicability of the models. As a result, ex-
cept in the case that all the conditions asserted in economic models are accomplished in the 
real world (even the ceteris paribus clauses), extrapolation of results will be meaningless. We 
face here a typical case of external validity: in order to ensure the inference of the model-
ling results structural assumptions are needed. This creates increasingly artificial situations, 
so there is no guarantee that such results are also obtained in circumstances that are beyond 
the model’s domain.
On the contrary, in the present paper it will be argued that, as long as some of the 
model assumptions are considered as conditions to be met in the real world, models will 
provide exportable information. Specifically, while all the model assumptions are necessary 
to infer results, they play different roles, which allow us to clarify the distinction between 
those assumptions that are relevant for policy implementation and those that are not. The 
assumptions of homogeneous goods, indifference curves differentiable at every point, econ-
omies with only two agents, etc., have the heuristic role of making more tractable the infer-
ence of results (see Musgrave 1981; Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and Marchionni 2010). Because 
this kind of assumptions is incorporated in models only for tractability purposes, their ful-
fillment in the real world seems to be meaningless.
At this juncture, robustness analysis is a good method for knowing which of the model 
assumptions must be understood as conditions of a policy blueprint. Broadly speaking, ro-
bustness analysis is a mode of analysis that provides epistemic support via triangulation: “a 
result is more likely to be real or reliable if a number of different and mutually independent 
routes lead to the same conclusion” (Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and Marchionni 2010, 544). 
These routes —as any experimental set-up and means of measurement— have their errors 
and biases. However, “independent ways of determining the same result reduce the prob-
ability of error due to mistakes and biases in those different ways of arriving at the result” 
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(p. 544). This will provide greater confidence that such results do not depend on the auxil-
iary factors of models, but rather on the substantive hypothesis.
Robustness analysis can be both empirical and theoretical. In the empirical triangula-
tion, experiments are carried out by different techniques, which contribute to reducing the 
chance of error, biases or mistakes that usually emerge in any experimental situation.3 How-
ever, there are situations in which the chances of carrying out empirical robustness analysis 
are remote. For this reason, many philosophers both in the social and the natural sciences 
advocate the use of theoretical robustness analysis, or in Woodward’s terms (2006), deriva-
tional robustness analysis. Theoretical triangulation resembles experimental triangulation. 
In the latter, the reliability of a hypothesis increases to the extent that similar results under 
changes in the experimental background conditions are obtained. In the case of theoretical 
triangulation, such reliability increases to the extent that similar results —usually called “ro-
bust theorems”— under changes in the model assumptions are obtained. More specifically 
—and using the terminology of Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009)— two kinds of assump-
tions in a model are distinguished: “substantive” and “auxiliary” assumptions. Substantive 
assumptions concern aspects of the model’s central causal mechanism about which one en-
deavors to make important assertions. They are assumptions that have some degree of em-
pirical merit, i.e. they are thought to be more or less true of the systems on which it is hoped 
that the model will shed some light (Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009). Auxiliary assumptions, 
on the other hand, play a heuristic or tractability role. They are required for making feasi-
ble the inferences from substantive assumptions to conclusions (Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 
2009). Let’s take for instance the assumption of indifference curves differentiable at every 
point. It is used in utility theory for making the inference of results easier or more tractable. 
However, such assumption is not expected to create significant biases or errors and, what is 
more, modify the inferred results. This means that, if other (tractability) assumptions were 
used, the inferred results should not be substantially different than the former case.
According to Weisberg (2006; 2012), (derivational) robustness analysis begins by ex-
amining a group of similar, but distinct models for a robust result or behavior R. The next 
step involves finding the common structure C which gives rise to the robust property. 
Given the distinction between auxiliary and substantive assumptions, we say that C is com-
prised of a set of substantive assumptions. Once these conditions are met, the theorist can 
formulate the robust theorem, which has the following form (see Weisberg 2006):
Ceteris paribus, if a common causal structure C obtains, then robust property R will obtain.
Let’s now suppose three models M1, M2 y M3, such that
M1: C & S1 n R
M2: C & S2 n R
M3: C & S3 n R
Ergo, C → R
3 Perhaps the best example of empirical robustness analysis is Avogadro’s constant (see Hacking 1983, 
54-5; Salmon 1984, 214-20).
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where C represents the set of substantive assumptions (or core mechanism), and where the 
Si represents the set of auxiliary assumptions (tractability assumptions, Galilean idealiza-
tions, etc.). It is assumed that S1 ≠ S2 ≠ S3. However, the three models share a common re-
sult R. In this context, the purpose of using derivational robustness analysis lies in (induc-
tively) inferring a robust theorem, where such theorem asserts that R does not depend on 
the auxiliary assumptions, but on the substantive assumptions (that is, C).
Cartwright (2009a) claims that economic models are over-constrained by structural 
or extra-Galilean assumptions. In the terminology used above, this is similar to saying that 
the model results depend on all the model assumptions (both substantive and auxiliary as-
sumptions). This may be true when we are making inferences and drawing results, and re-
searchers who advocate the use of derivational robustness analysis are aware of this. If one 
could infer R without using any auxiliary assumptions, derivational robustness analysis 
would be meaningless. Derivational robustness analysis arises precisely because the infer-
ence of the model results intrinsically depends on this kind of assumptions. However, with 
derivational robustness analysis it is expected to argue that there is a property R which actu-
ally depends on a set of substantive assumptions.
To illustrate this situation let’s take three liberal models of international trade. A first 
model —the “Ricardian” model of comparative advantage— assumes one factor of produc-
tion (labor), perfect competition, no transportation costs, constant opportunity costs, etc. 
Based on these (and other) assumptions it can be asserted that if (1) the relative prices of 
goods between countries in autarky are different, (2) the equilibrium relative price lies be-
tween the relative prices in autarky of both countries, and (3) each country specializes in 
the production of the commodity with comparative advantage, then countries opened to 
the international trade will obtain more benefits than in autarky.
Let’s now suppose a second model —the neoclassical model of international trade— 
which, unlike the previous one, introduces concave utility functions throughout its domain, 
increasing opportunity costs, two factors of production (capital and labor), etc. Some in-
ferences will be different. For example, in the Ricardian model opportunity costs are con-
stant, and as a consequence specialization of commodities is total. Instead, in the neo-classical 
model opportunity costs rise with increasing output, so specialization of commodities is par-
tial. However, they share a common result: the benefits of opening up to international trade, 
as long as (1) the relative prices of goods between countries in autarky are different, (2) the 
equilibrium relative price lies between the relative prices in autarky of both countries, and (3) 
each country specializes in the production of the commodity with comparative advantage.
A third model (the Hescher-Holin model of international trade) introduces new con-
cepts. Firstly, countries have different relative endowments of the factors of production 
(land, labor, and capital).In addition to this, those goods that require inputs that are locally 
abundant will be cheaper to produce than those goods that require inputs that are locally 
scarce. From these and other assumptions it is inferred that each country specializes in the 
production of the good that intensively uses the factor it is relatively richer in (Hecksher-
Ohlin Theorem). However, this model shares a common result: if (1) the relative prices of 
the goods between countries in autarky are different, (2) the equilibrium relative price lies 
between the relative prices in autarky of both countries, and (3) each country specializes in 
the production of the commodity with comparative advantage, then countries opened to 
the international trade will obtain more benefits than in autarky. Thus, the robust theorem 
may be expressed in the following way:
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Ceteris paribus, if
— the relative prices of goods between countries in autarky are different,
— the equilibrium relative price lies between the relative prices in autarky of both 
countries, and
— each country specializes in the production of the commodity with comparative ad-
vantage,
then countries opened to the international trade will obtain more benefits than in autarky.
However, the analysis does not end there. The robust theorem is a conditional state-
ment that says: “if a set of substantive assumptions C obtains, then robust property R will 
obtain”. In other words, the relationship between C and R is not causal, but logical or con-
ceptual. In this context, Bunge (1997) distinguishes between two kinds of systems: con-
crete and conceptual. A concrete system is “a bundle of real things held together by some 
bonds or forces, behaving as a unit in some respects and (except for the universe as a whole) 
embedded in some environment” (Bunge 1997, 415). Natural, social and technical systems 
are concrete. In contrast, models, theories, classifications and codes are “conceptual sys-
tems”, and their bonds are not material or causal but logical.
Hence, the knowledge of robust theorems is about something that takes place in the 
conceptual system, and even something that could take place in the real world. That is the 
reason why robust theorems are considered “blueprints” for policy implementation. Never-
theless, to make such kind of statements it is necessary to take a leap from conceptual sys-
tem to concrete system. More precisely, when the leap toward concrete system is made, the 
robust theorem must be understood in a feasibility sense, i.e.,
If causal structure C is obtained in the real world, then R is likely to be obtained.
The causal relationship between C and R is not guaranteed. To be causal, C has to produce 
R. However, there are many reasons why, although C is obtained, R may not emerge in the 
real world. In the Keynes effect, even if the necessary measures are carried out in the real 
world, R might not emerge. Such emergence depends on a myriad of reasons. Some of these 
reasons may be associated with the countering of the causal contribution (e.g., the capacity 
is exercised, but the manifest results are not obtained). It also may be related with the devi-
ation of the socioeconomic process towards other nodes of the possibility tree. If the inter-
est rate is very low and people believe that it may rise in the near future, then even if an in-
crease in money supply occurs, people will not buy financial assets. If entrepreneurs do not 
have good expectations of future sales, then even if the interest rate is falling the level of in-
vestment will not rise. The core structure C mentioned in the present paper is not a nomo-
logical machine that works in isolation or shielded from external influences. Instead, it op-
erates in open systems. While it is expected that once C is obtained R will occur in the real 
world, we must be aware that this may not be the case.
The difference between the idea of overconstraint and the approach defended here is 
straightforward. For Cartwright, the models that allow exporting information about ca-
pacities are those which mimic Galilean experiments. This turns out to be problematic in 
economics because of the scarcity of economic principles. For the case of policy implemen-
tation, this is like saying that such extrapolated knowledge would only be meaningful if all 
the model assumptions (including the tractability assumptions) were met. Instead, while it 
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is true that the policy maker must necessarily make use of structural assumptions for clos-
ing the several courses of action of a possibility tree in economic models, we must recog-
nize, however, that not all the model assumptions play the same role. That is why the use of 
derivational robustness analysis has been proposed: to find those conditions which, in the 
real world, are expected to play a substantial role in the production of R. The robust theo-
rem serves as theoretical basis for policy implementation, which consists of fulfilling the set 
of conditions specified in the theorem. Once the policy is implemented, the desired result 
is likely to be obtained in the real world.
Permanent/dynamic interventions
So far certain problems concerning the need for an invariant knowledge for accomplish-
ing interventionist purposes have been exposed. To begin with, there exists an ontologi-
cal problem: there are no capacities or nomological machines, but possibility trees or open-
ended results. There also exists a problem with its use: the discovery of invariant factors 
(if possible) in one scenario does not guarantee its use in other different scenarios (the 
problem of “external validity”) nor in a scenario where the structure that supports it has 
changed (the problem of “unstable enablers”).
In this section a new issue will be considered: the idea of “intervention”. Since many 
philosophical approaches assume the feasibility of both acquiring and using invariant 
causal factors, the idea of intervention turns out to be an ex-ante concept: once the mecha-
nism, capacity, or nomological machine has been found (or constructed), the intervention 
consists of activating the triggering factor. After this a sequence that leads automatically to 
an expected result will begin.
Nevertheless, as far as socioeconomic policy implementation is concerned, the ex-ante 
notion of intervention is misleading, or at least incomplete. Interventions will be important 
not only in the start-conditions of socioeconomic processes, but also in the intermediate 
stages of such processes. Let’s take once again the Keynes effect. It is a socioeconomic proc-
ess that takes place to the extent that certain conditions are met. Regarding its functioning, 
it is clear that in order to increase the national income, more than one intervention (not 
only ex-ante interventions) should be carried out. One of the multiple interventions is to 
increase the money supply (the triggering factor is activated). However we have seen above 
that such an intervention may not be enough. It will also be necessary for people to increase 
their demand of financial assets, that employers have good expectations of future sales, etc.
Let’s suppose that the Keynes effect takes place in the real world by means of a policy 
implemented at a specific point in time. In such a policy not only the set of conditions have 
been met, but also the triggering factor (increase in money supply) has been properly acti-
vated. We have here an ex-ante intervention, precisely the kind of manipulations advocated 
by many interventionist approaches. However, the system where the Keynes effect takes 
place is open (see Lawson 1997; 2003), so it is not “shielded” from external perturbing fac-
tors. This means that any factor is likely to bring about distortions, which could result in a 
deviation of the socioeconomic process from the expected path. Continuing the example 
of the Keynes effect, it is possible that the marginal efficiency of capital decreases because 
some signals from the market bring about negative expectations of future sales. This ob-
stacle may not have been foreseen (and indeed, most of the time is often so) by the policy 
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makers. Therefore, the ex-ante idea of intervention is inadequate for understanding the ra-
tionale of policy implementation in socioeconomic processes. In order to reach the desired 
results permanent interventions must be taken into account.4
The break with the interventionist approaches examined in this paper is evident. Be-
cause such approaches assume the feasibility of using stable causal factors, they —implic-
itly— assume an ex-ante notion of intervention. They do not criticize the idea of perma-
nent interventions, because they do not even take it into account. In assuming the feasibility 
of stable regularities these approaches end up drawing analogies of interventions with vend-
ing machines. But if socioeconomic processes are not the consequence of stable causal fac-
tors, then analogies should not be associated with vending machines, but with cases that in-
volve permanent interventions, such as driving a car or managing a football match. When 
driving a car we must intervene at every moment. Even if we got a GPS, if we are familiar-
ized with the foot pedals, if we know how to use the shift lever, we have already checked the 
air pressure in tires, etc., we must constantly intervene. This is because drivers face a world 
that to some extent is unknown: we do not know if a street is closed, if there are bumps in 
the road, sometimes we may get lost, etc. Similarly, a football team manager may design a 
strategy based on information both from his team and from the rival team (players availa-
ble for the next match, the rival’s possible tactics, etc.). However, once the game has kicked 
off things may not result as expected. Due to these unexpected circumstances, managers 
usually end up modifying their initial strategy.
In the above examples interventions are not only ex-ante, but also during the course 
of the process. And the fact that policy makers must intervene permanently or during the 
course of a socioeconomic process does not depend on their inability to make good blue-
prints, but on their facing an open and uncertain scenario. Policy makers may develop a 
blueprint that is expected to be useful for reaching a result. However, because they inter-
vene on open systems there exists the possibility that contingencies will appear, and some-
times such contingencies may involve altogether changing the initial plan.
Extensions
Although for reasons of space some issues have not been discussed in the present paper, it 
is important to note that they require further discussion. The first issue concerns the use 
of derivational robustness analysis. Earlier on it has been argued that the discovery of ro-
bust theorems allows us to export results to different backgrounds. However, derivational 
robustness analysis involves making inductive inference, so that its use may originate some 
drawbacks. To begin with, there are external validity problems related to the differences be-
tween the context of discovery and the context of application of causal factors (Cartwright 
2007; Jiménez Buedo and Miller 2010). Likewise, there exists the chance that the inferred 
4 However, we must recognize that these interventions are not necessarily based on an invariant knowl-
edge. For instance, policy makers may try to increase the marginal efficiency of capital through a 
number of signals that have positive repercussions on entrepreneurs. Let’s suppose that such policy 
consists of providing incentives for production, or making agreements between workers and entrepre-
neurs or the like. If these arrangements are mainly grounded on the socio-cultural context of that time, 
it is clear that policy makers will not be making use of invariant knowledge.
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robust theorem may be false. In this latter case, in order to achieve greater reliability such 
analysis should be complemented, for instance, with a research that involves finding models 
which share the common structure C but with inferred results other than R. The models of 
international trade developed by Emmanuel (1972) on the one hand and Prebisch (1950; 
1959) on the other hand may exemplify this situation. Prebisch’s model shares the three 
conditions specified in the robust theorem: (1) the relative prices of the goods between 
countries in autarky are different, (2) the equilibrium relative price lies between the rela-
tive prices in autarky of both countries, and (3) each country specializes in the production 
of the commodity with comparative advantage. Nevertheless, this model introduces a new 
assumption: the systematic deterioration of the terms of trade. In a static model —or one 
period model— international prices do not fluctuate. However, it may occur in a dynamic 
—or more than one period— model. Therefore, an additional condition (4) should be 
added to the robust theorem: that no significant changes in the terms of trade are observed 
intertemporally. Something similar happens in Emmanuel’s theory of unequal exchange. 
Unlike the “liberal” models examined in the robustness analysis, Emmanuel’s model as-
sumes capital mobility between countries. If this is to occur, then a process of foreign direct 
investment will start, which will end up generating benefits to one country albeit to the 
detriment of the other. Therefore, another condition (5) should be taken into account: no 
capital mobility among countries.
It is also important that the common structure C refers to a set of conditions that are 
achievable in the real world. This may reopen once again the issue about the realism of as-
sumptions in economics. While it is true that Friedman (1953) has posed the infeasibil-
ity of testing the assumptions independently of the model implications, it is also true that 
the use of realistic assumptions can be a good basis for thinking which blueprints are more 
or less plausible for a successful policy. More precisely, Friedman argues that it is not ad-
equate to ask about the realism of assumptions, because they never are. What is important 
is that assumptions are good approximations to reality, and the only way to know it is by 
examining the implications of the models. However, assessing the performance of mod-
els or blueprints according to their predictive accuracy leads to external validity problems. 
Just as Cartwright (2012) criticized the evidence-based policy approach for assuming that 
a policy that worked somewhere will also work “here and now”, the idea of using accurate 
predictive models may be put into question in the same way: there is no guarantee that 
models that worked in the past will provide accurate predictions in the target system. In 
addition to this, Musgrave (1981) criticizes Friedman’s approach for not being able to dis-
tinguish between three different types of assumptions: neglibility assumptions, domain as-
sumptions and heuristic assumptions. Musgrave recognizes that both neglibility and heu-
ristic assumptions may be unrealistic. However, domain assumptions have to be realistic, 
as they specify the scope, domain or range of applicability of models. Therefore, if domain 
assumptions are always false, then the theory containing it can be applied to no actual 
situation. Unlike the two other cases, Musgrave pretends more realism to this class: “the 
more unrealistic domain assumptions are, the less testable and hence less significant is the 
theory. Contrariwise, the more significant the theory, the more widely applicable it will 
be” (Musgrave 1981, 382).
Finally, even if causal principles are used in conjunction with a set of helping factors, 
or if robust theorems are inferred with great confidence, or if any other kind of theoretical 
knowledge is used for policy purposes, such knowledge may not be enough for controlling 
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the behavior of socioeconomic variables. It is also necessary to understand how to influence 
people’s minds and decisions. For example, it has been shown in the Keynes effect that, in 
order to increase the level of investment, a lower interest rate may not be enough: it also de-
pends on the entrepreneurs’ future sales expectations. Reducing the interest rate is a step 
that can be implemented in a rather direct way. However, dissipating the entrepreneurs’ 
uncertainty is somehow more difficult to achieve because it depends on a complex set of 
factors. In particular, it presupposes a kind of knowledge that, properly speaking, is not sci-
entific knowledge. Theoretical knowledge instructs about “what” (i.e., what expectations 
would be suitable for reaching the goals), but not about “how” (how to obtain them). It is 
known that good future sales expectations must be achieved, but the theory does not say 
anything about how to generate them.
Therefore, policy makers face two types of problems. One is purely theoretical and con-
cerns how to reach a result R, such as stop childhood malnutrition, improve academic qual-
ity or increase the level of employment. However, there are other problems for which theo-
retical knowledge is unproductive. These problems are not exclusively economic problems 
(e.g. how to lower inflation, improve national income, etc.). On the contrary, they are asso-
ciated with people’s decisions and actions, such as how to improve entrepreneurs’ expecta-
tions, how to negotiate with the IMF or how to solve conflicts with a trade union. Another 
kind of knowledge is needed: a practical knowledge or “know-how” (Ivarola, Marqués and 
Weisman 2013).
Clearly, the solution to these problems requires a knowledge that, for obvious reasons, 
economic theory does not provide. The rationale of socioeconomic processes involves not 
only economic problems, but also social problems. Thus, the solution of how to achieve 
a socioeconomic result requires both theoretical and extra-theoretical knowledge. The 
idea that a successful intervention depends on using theoretical knowledge is not denied. 
Rather, it is stressed that, even in possession of such knowledge, it only informs us about 
the possibility of modifying a factor Y by changing another factor X (and the Keynes effect 
tells us about the possibility of increasing the level of employment and national income as 
long as positive changes in money supply are carried out). Although theoretical knowledge 
is not problematic from an epistemic point of view, we must recognize that, for interven-
tionist purposes, it is not enough. On the contrary, and in order to increase the chances of 
success in policy implementation, such knowledge must be complemented with extra-theo-
retical or “know-how” knowledge.
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